We consider the classic problem of envy-free division of a heterogeneous good ("cake") among several agents. It is known that, when the allotted pieces must be connected, the problem cannot be solved by a finite protocol for 3 or more agents. Even when the pieces may be disconnected, no bounded-time protocol is known for 5 or more agents. The impossibility result, however, assumes that the entire cake must be allocated. In this paper we replace the entire-allocation requirement with a weaker partial-proportionality requirement: the piece given to each agent must be worth for it at least a certain positive fraction of the entire cake value. We prove that this version of the problem is solvable in bounded time even when the pieces must be connected. Moreover, for 3 agents the guaranteed fraction is 1/3, which is the best that can be guaranteed. For 4 agents and disconnected pieces, the guaranteed fraction is 1/4. When the pieces may be disconnected, the guaranteed fraction for n agents can be made as close to 1/n as wanted: a fraction of (1 − ǫ)/n can be attained in time O(4 n ln(1/ǫ)).
Introduction
Fair cake-cutting is an active field of research with applications in mathematics, economics, and recently also in AI. The basic setting considers a heterogeneous good, usually described as a one-dimensional interval, that must be divided among several agents. The different agents may have different preferences over the possible pieces of the good. The goal is to divide the good among the agents in a way that is deemed "fair". Fairness can be defined in several ways, of which proportionality and envy-freeness are the most commonly used.
Proportionality means that each agent gets at least its "fair-share" of the good, i.e. with n agents, the piece allotted to each agent is worth at least 1/n of the value of the entire good -according to the agent's subjective value measure. Envy-freeness means that every agent believes that its piece is weakly better than any other piece -no agent would prefer to get a piece allotted to another agent.
An additional requirement in cake-cutting, particularly relevant when the divided resource is land, is connectivity -each agent must be given a single contiguous piece.
Proportional division is a relatively easy task, and the initial work of Steinhaus [24] already provided a protocol for n agents with connected pieces which runs in polynomial time. 4 Envy-free division, on the other hand, turns out to be much more challenging. With connected pieces, the only protocol for envy-free division is an infinite one; that is, it may require an infinite number of queries to reach an envy-free division [27] . Indeed, Stromquist [26] proved that this is necessarily so; any protocol for computing an envy-free division with connected pieces must require an infinite number of queries on some inputs. This is so even when there are only 3 agents! With disconnected pieces, three finite protocols are known. However, their run-time is not bounded -they might require an arbitrarily large number of queries on some inputs.
A closer examination of these discouraging results reveals that they critically rely on the assumption that the entire cake must be divided. In many practical situations, it may be possible to leave some parts of the cake un-divided, a possibility termed free disposal. If, for example, your children spend too much time quarreling over the single cherry on top of the cake, one practical solution is to throw away that cherry and divide only the rest of the cake. As another example, when dividing land it is usually possible (and sometimes even desirable) to leave some parts of the land unallocated, so that they can be used freely by the public. The question of interest in this paper is thus:
If free disposal is allowed, can an envy-free allocation be computed in bounded time?
This question, however, turns out to have a trivial, but uninteresting, answer; It is always possible to give nothing to all agents, which is an envy-free allocation. Thus, the interesting question is whether it is possible to devise a bounded-time algorithm for envy-free division in which each agent gets a strictly positive value.
Main Results
Our first protocol provides an affirmative answer to this question (Section 4):
Theorem 1. There is a bounded-time protocol that, for any number of agents, computes an envy-free allocation giving each agent a connected piece with a positive value, assuming free disposal. The bound on the number of queries depends only on the number of agents.
Having established that bounded-time protocols indeed exist, we next consider the quality of the solution they offer. The above mentioned protocol produces an allocation that is indeed positive for all agents, but may, in worst case, give some players only a 1/2 n−1 value (where n is the number of agents). In contrast, an envy-free allocation of the entire cake is also proportional -it gives each agent a value of at least 1/n, 5 which is the best that can be guaranteed.
Our second protocol guarantees each of 3 agents a value of at least 1/3. This proves that, for three agents, envy-freeness and proportionality and connectivity can be achieved simultaneously in bounded time (Section 5):
There is a bounded-time protocol that, for three agents, computes an envy-free and proportional allocation with connected pieces, assuming free disposal.
For 4 agents, we do not have an envy-free-proportional protocol with connected pieces. We have a different protocol which we call an envy-free-VIP protocol. This protocol is run with a certain pre-specified agent as the VIP. The VIP cuts the cake to n subjectively-equal pieces. The other agents then do some trimmings, making sure to keep one of the n pieces untrimmed. The final outcome is an envy-free division of a part of the cake, in which the VIP agent receives his proportional share of 1/n. We present three applications of this envy-free-VIP algorithm:
• An envy-free division with connected pieces and free disposal, in which the value per agent is at least 1/7 (Section 6).
• An envy-free and proportional division with disconnected pieces and free disposal (Section 7).
• An envy-free division of the entire cake with disconnected pieces (Section 8).
Although these three applications are not new (e.g. the last one was already described by Aziz and Mackenzie [4] ), their importance lies in the fact that they utilize the same, simple building block. This means that finding an envy-free-VIP protocol for 5 agents may result in advancements in all these three problems.
For n agents, we prove that when the pieces may be disconnected, proportionality can be approximated to any desired accuracy (Section 7): Theorem 3. There is a bounded-time protocol that, for every number n of agents and for every approximation constant ǫ > 0, computes an envyfree allocation giving each agent a connected piece worth at least (1 − ǫ)/n, assuming free disposal. The bound on the number of queries is O(ln(1/ǫ)·4 n ). Table 1 summarizes our results and compares them to related work.
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• Pieces column: whether the pieces are Connected or Disconnected.
• Queries column: all expressions are in order of magnitude and should be understood as enclosed in O(...).
• d and k are parameters of the valuation functions (maximum degree of polynomials and number of pieces, respectively).
• Envy column: ǫ is an additive approximation constant (every agent values other pieces at most ǫ more than its own piece).
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in the unrestricted model, the protocol may give each agent several disconnected pieces. Proportional division is well understood from a computational perspective. The protocol of Steinhaus [24] generates a proportional division with connected pieces in O(n 2 ) queries, and an improved protocol by Even and Paz [15] requires only O(n log n) queries. Later results proved that this runtime is asymptotically optimal even if disconnected pieces are allowed Woeginger and Sgall [28] , Edmonds and Pruhs [13] .
Envy-free division is a much harder task, even when only 3 agents are involved. The first envy-free division protocol for 3 agents with connected pieces was published by Stromquist [25] . This protocol is not discrete -it requires the agents to simultaneously hold knives over the cake and move them in a continuous manner. This means that this protocol cannot be accurately executed by a computer in finite time. A discrete and finite protocol for envy-free division for 3 agents was constructed by Selfridge and Conway Brams and Taylor [7] , but it generates partitions with disconnected pieces.
Finding an envy-free division among four or more agents was a longstanding open problem. It was solved only in the 1990's, both for connected and disconnected pieces. Su [27] presented a protocol, attributed to Forest Simmons, for envy-free division with connected pieces, but it is not finite -it converges to an envy-free division after a possibly infinite number of queries. Brams and Taylor [6] , Robertson and Webb [20] and Pikhurko [17] presented three different protocols for envy-free division with disconnected pieces; while these protocols are guaranteed to terminate in finite time, their run-time is not a bounded function of n. The most recent breakthrough is due to Aziz and Mackenzie [4] , who published a pre-print of the first bounded-time algorithm for 4 agents (with disconnected pieces).
Two important hardness results were proved in the 2000's. Stromquist [26] proved that an envy-free division with connected pieces cannot be found by any finite protocol, whether bounded or unbounded. This proved that the problem of connected envy-free division is strictly more difficult than the problem of disconnected envy-free division. Shortly afterward, Procaccia [18] proved an Ω(n 2 ) lower bound on the query complexity of any envyfree division protocol, even with disconnected pieces. This proved that the problem of envy-free division is strictly more difficult than the problem of proportional division.
Approximations
Cake-cutters have tried to cope with the difficulty of envy-free division in several ways.
One way is to relax the envy-freeness criterion and allow a small amount of envy. Brams and Taylor [7] describe a re-entrant variant of Steinhaus' protocol which produces a division with disconnected pieces in which the envy of every agent is at most an additive constant ǫ (for every agent, the value of its piece plus ǫ is at least the value of any other piece). The number of queries is polynomial in n and linear in (1/ǫ). Deng et al. [10] present a similar approximation with connected pieces; here the number of queries is exponential in n and polynomial in (1/ǫ). In contrast to these results, our protocols guarantee full envy-freeness. Our protocol for disconnected piece also guarantees an additive approximation to proportionality. The number of queries in our approximation is exponential in n but logarithmic in (1/ǫ) (in other words, it is linear in the binary representation of the approximation constant).
A second way is to restrict the value function of the agents. Kurokawa et al. [16] require the value functions to be piecewise-linear and find an envy-free division with disconnected pieces in time polynomial in the size of the representation of the value functions. Deng et al. [10] require the value functions to be Lipschitz-continuous and find an approximately-envyfree division with connected pieces. Brânzei [8] requires the value functions to be polynomials of bounded degree and find an envy-free division with connected pieces in time polynomial in the maximum degree. In contrast to these results, our protocols apply to arbitrary non-atomic value functions, and their runtime guarantee is a function of only the number of agents but not the peculiarities of their valuation functions.
Free disposal
The free disposal assumption was introduced into envy-free cake-cutting by Saberi and Wang [21] . They used it only for 4 agents and disconnected pieces.
Later, free disposal has also been studied by Arzi et al. [1] . They proved that discarding some parts of the cake may allow us to achieve an envyfree division with an improved social welfare (i.e. the sum of the utilities of the agents is larger than in the no-free-disposal case). They call this phenomenon the dumping paradox. Our paper demonstrate a different kind of a dumping paradox -we show that dumping some parts of the cake can be beneficial not only from an economic perspective but also from a computational perspective.
A third scenario in which free disposal is required is when the pieces must have a pre-specified geometric shape, such as a square [22] .
There is some related work concerning allocation of indivisible goods where the same idea of not allocating all the objects is used to get better fairness results [5, 3] . 6 Partial proportionality was introduced by Edmonds and Pruhs [12] , Edmonds et al. [14] , who used it, like us, to reduce the query complexity. They presented a protocol for finding a partially-proportional division with a query complexity of O(n), which is better than the optimum of O(n log n) required for finding a fully-proportional division.
Computational models
The most prominent computational model for discrete cake-cutting is the mark-eval model of Robertson and Webb [20] . A different model, the cutchoose model, was recently suggested by Branzei et al. [9] . Our protocols use a single primitive query -Equalize (see Section 3). An Equalize query can be implemented by a bounded number of mark-eval queries or cut-choose queries. Hence, our protocols are bounded in both these models.
Paper structure
The model is formally defined in Section 2. The main tools used in our division protocols, the preference graph and the Equalize query, are introduced in Section 3. These tools are exemplified through a simple, suboptimal protocol for 3 agents.
A partially-proportional protocol for n agents with connected pieces is presented in Section 4, followed by a proportional protocol for 3 agents (Section 5) and an improved partially-proportional protocol for 4 agents (Section 6). An almost-proportional protocol for n agents with disconnected pieces is presented in Section 7. An application of our tools and results to envy-free division with no disposal is presented in Section 8.
Model and Notation
The cake is assumed to be the unit interval [0, 1]. There are n agents, denoted by A 1 ,A 2 ,...,A n . When the number of agents is small, they are denoted instead by A,B,C,... or by Alice,Bob,Carl...
The cake has to be divided among the agents, giving each agent A i a subset X i ⊂ [0, 1] such that the subsets given to any two different agents are disjoint. When connected pieces are required, each X i must be an interval; when disconnected pieces are allowed, each X i may be a finite union of intervals.
Agent A i has a preference relation ≻ i which is represented by a value measure V i . The term "measure" implies that it is additive -the value of a piece is equal to the sum of the values of its parts. All value measures are absolutely continuous with respect to length. This implies that all singular points have a value of 0 to all agents, i.e. there are no valuable "atoms" which cannot be divided. The value measures are normalized such that V i ([0, 1]) = 1. All these assumptions are standard in the cake-cutting literature.
An envy-free partition is a partition in which each agent values his allocated subset at least as much as every other allocated subset:
In addition to envy-freeness, every partition can be characterized by its level of proportionality, which is the value of the least fortunate agent (also known as egalitarian social welfare):
An allocation with a proportionality of 1/n is usually called a proportional allocation.
Tools
Our protocols are described in a bottom-up approach. We first present basic tools that perform well-defined tasks, then combine these tools to get a full protocol. We believe that the bottom-up approach may be beneficial to future cake-cutters, that may use our tools to develop improved protocols.
The preference graph
At any time during the execution of a protocol, there is a certain number of pieces on the table, which together comprise the entire cake. The preference graph is a bipartite graph, in which the nodes in one side represent the n agents and the nodes in the other side represent the pieces. The pieces are denoted as numbers with a hat, e.g. 1, 2, etc. There is an edge from an agent A k to a piece i if A k prefers i, i.e., for every piece j: i k j. Note that an agent can "prefer" two or more pieces. This means that the agent is indifferent between these pieces but values any of them more than any other piece. Here are two possible preference graphs for three agents:
Both graphs may be the result of Alice cutting the cake to 3 pieces which are equal in her eyes. In the left graph, Bob and Carl each prefer a different piece; in the right graph, they prefer the same piece ( 3) .
A saturated matching in a bipartite graph is a subset of the edges, in which each agent-node has a single neighbor and each piece-node has at most a single neighbor. A saturating matching in the preference graph corresponds to an envy-free allocation of the cake, since every agent is allocated a preferred piece.
A well-known tool for proving the existence of saturated matchings in bipartite graphs is Hall's marriage theorem. This theorem, applied to our setting, implies the following lemma: Lemma 1. An envy-free allocation exists, if and only if for every k = 1, . . . , n, every group of k agents jointly prefers at least k pieces.
In a preference graph, Hall's condition is always satisfied for groups of k = 1 agents since every agent has at least one preferred piece.
In the left graph above, Hall's condition is also satisfied for every group of 2 or 3 agents; this means that an envy-free allocation exists. Indeed, the allocation A-1, B-2 and C-3 is envy-free.
In the right graph above, Hall's condition is violated by the group {B,C}. This means that an envy-free allocation cannot be attained using the existing pieces. In this case, the graph should be transformed in order to create a graph that meets Hall's condition. The main query we use to transform the preference graph is the Equalize query, which is described in the next subsection.
The Equalize query
An Equalize(k) query asks an agent to mark zero or more pieces such that, if the pieces are cut according to these marks, that agent will have k preferred pieces. For example, in right graph above, an Equalize(2) query to Bob implies the following question: "where would you cut piece 3, your currently favorite piece, such that you will have two equally-best pieces?". Note that this query can be implemented by a constant number of mark and eval queries of the standard model [20] .
Suppose Bob's second-best piece is 2. Bob can answer the Equalize(2) question in one of two ways:
, then 3 should be cut to two pieces of equal value, which is V B ( 3)/2. 2. Otherwise, 3 should be cut to two unequal pieces -one having a value of V B ( 2) and the other having a smaller value
A third option is that V B ( 3) = V B ( 2). In this case, no cutting is needed since Bob already has two pieces of equal value and better than the third piece. Here and in the rest of the paper, we ignore such fortunate coincidences. This does not lose generality, because it only decreases the number of edges in the preference graph, and thus makes it harder to find a saturated matching. In other words, if Bob happens to prefer more than one piece from Alice's three pieces, we can arbitrarily remove from the preference graph all but a single edge and go on to search for a saturated matching in the reduced graph. Every saturated matching in the reduced graph is also a saturated matching in the original graph.
Formally, we make the following assumption about the preference graph: Assumption 1. After an agent A cuts a piece i, if an agent B = A prefers a piece j = i, then B does not prefer i.
This assumption has several corollaries which are implicitly used below. For every set P of pieces, define the last cutter of P to be the last agent who made a cut on any piece of P . Then:
• If an agent A prefers a set P of pieces with |P | ≥ 2, then A is the last cutter of P .
• Each two agent-nodes in the preference graph have at most one neighbor at common (there is at most one piece that both agents prefer).
• If an agent cuts the cake to several equal pieces, then every other agent prefers exactly one piece (as in the graphs above).
If the protocol implements Bob's suggested cuts, the preference graph is transformed in one of the following ways, depending on whether Bob gave an answer of type 1 or of type 2:
Note that the edge A-3 is gone, because piece 3 has been trimmed by Bob so its value for Alice is probably smaller. By Assumption 1, we ignore the fortunate coincidence in which Bob trimmed a part which happens to be worthless for Alice. The edges A-1 and A-2 remain, because these two pieces were not touched by Bob.
The dotted edges emanating from C imply that we do not know which piece is preferred by Carl after the cuts, since his previously-best piece -3 -has been trimmed. On the other hand, we know that Bob now prefers two pieces -one of them is the trimmed 3 and the other is another piece, which is either his previously-second-best piece 2 or the new piece 4.
Even though we don't know which piece is now preferred by Carl, we can be sure that a saturated matching exists. This follows from the following lemma:
Lemma 2. Suppose the n agents are divided to n − 1 agents whose preferences are known and one agent whose preferences are unknown. If for every k = 1, . . . , n − 1, every group of k known agents jointly prefers at least k + 1 pieces, then an envy-free allocation exists.
Proof. Suppose every group of k known agents jointly prefers at least k +1 pieces. Then, for any possible preference of the unknown agent, every group of k + 1 agents jointly prefers at least k + 1 pieces. Additionally, every group of 1 agent always prefers at least 1 piece. Hence, by Lemma 1 an envy-free allocation exists.
In the graphs above, there are two known agents -A and B, and one unknown agent -C. Each of the known agents prefers two pieces, and the two of them together prefer 3 or 4 pieces. Hence, whatever C's preference may be, a saturated matching exists and an envy-free allocation can be found.
In the rest of this paper, we make the following additional assumption on the preference graph:
Assumption 2. When a new piece is created by a cut, it is not the preferred piece of any agent.
So in the example above, we assume the graph at the right. This assumption is justified because, from Hall's perspective, it only makes it harder to find a saturated matching -it concentrates the same number of edges over a smaller number of piece nodes. Hence, the new pieces are omitted from the preference graphs; only their total number is kept in mind.
Example: a protocol for 3 agents
By now, we have described an envy-free division protocol for three agents. The protocol can be succinctly summarized by the following two statements:
In words: the protocol asks Alice to cut the cake to 3 equal pieces in her eyes, then asks Bob to cut one of these pieces in order to make 2 equallybest pieces in his eyes. The outcome always looks like one of the preference graphs above, which means that a saturated matching exists and each agent can be allocated a best piece.
The last step of the protocol is to actually find the matching and implement the corresponding envy-free allocation. To do this in our case, it is sufficient to ask Carl to pick his best piece, then ask Bob to pick one of his best pieces (which must be the piece that he trimmed, if it is still available), then ask Alice to pick a remaining piece. In the rest of this paper, we suppress this last step from the description of our protocols. Since a maximum matching in a bipartite graph can always be found in polynomial time, it is sufficient to prove that the protocol guarantees that a saturated matching exists.
The Envy-Free-Proportionality Lemma
We now calculate the proportionality of the resulting allocation -the value guarantee per agent. This is based on a general lemma which we call the EFP (Envy-Free-Proportionality) lemma:
Lemma 3. (EFP Lemma) If a cake is partitioned to a set of M ≥ n pieces and each agent receives a single preferred piece from that set, then the division is envy-free and its proportionality is at least 1/M .
Proof. Envy-freeness is obvious since each agent receives one of his best pieces. Proportionality is a result of the fact that the value functions of the agents are measures, so they are additive. The sum of the values of all pieces is the value of the entire cake. Hence, by the pigeonhole principle, the value of any best piece is at least 1/M of the total cake value.
Going back to our cake-cutting protocol, we see that the protocol partitions the cake to M = 4 pieces. Hence, by the EFP lemma, it generates an envy-free division with connected pieces and a proportionality of at least 1/4. This is only a warm-up protocol; the protocol of Section 5 attains the best proportionality, which is 1/3.
Before continuing with more advanced division protocols, we simplify Lemma 2:
Lemma 4. Suppose the n agents are divided to n − 1 agents whose preferences are known and one agent whose preferences are unknown. If every known agent prefers at least 2 pieces, then an envy-free allocation exists.
Proof. By Lemma 2, it is sufficient to prove that every k known agents jointly prefer at least k + 1 pieces. The proof is by induction on k. The base k = 1 is given in the lemma. Suppose this is true for all groups of less than k known agents. Consider a group of k known agents A 1 , . . . , A k . Each of these agents prefers at least two pieces. By Assumption 1, each of these agents was the last one to cut at least one of his two preferred pieces. Suppose that the last agent to cut one of his preferred pieces was A 1 . Suppose that A 1 prefers pieces 1, 2 and that he was the last agent to cut 1.
By Assumption 1 again, any other agent that prefers 1 does not prefer any other piece. This means that any other known agent does not prefer 1. By the induction assumption, agents A 2 , . . . , A k jointly prefer k pieces, which must be different than 1. With 1, agents A 1 , . . . , A k jointly prefer k + 1 pieces.
Protocol for n Agents
Generalizing the 3-agent protocol from the Section 3 to n agents requires the following building blocks: an Equalize(k) query for arbitrary k, and a generalized version of the Lemma 4. We now describe each of these generalizations in turn.
Answering an Equalize(k) query k ≥ 3 is a difficult task because there are many different options. For example, a reply to Equalize(3) can have one of the following forms:
1. Cutting the best piece to three equal pieces, which are all better than the previously second-best piece; or -2. Trimming the best piece such that it is twice as valuable as the secondbest piece, then cutting the result to two halves; or -3. Trimming both the best and the second-best pieces, such that the trimmed pieces are equal to the third-best piece.
The number of options grows as k becomes larger.
Finding an answer to Equalize(k) is equivalent to solving the following envy-free stick division problem:
Given m sticks of different lengths, make a minimal number of cuts such that there are at least k pieces with equal lengths and no other piece is longer.
Fortunately, Reitzig and Wild [19] have recently solved the envy-free stickdivision problem: they presented an algorithm that solves it in time O(m). For our purposes, it is sufficient to know that an agent can answer an Equalize(k) query in bounded time.
The next tool we need is a generalization of Lemma 4.
Lemma 5. Suppose the n agents are divided to n − u agents whose preferences are known and u agents whose preferences are unknown. If every known agent prefers at least 1+ 2 u−1 pieces, then an envy-free allocation can be attained with a bounded number of queries.
Proof. The proof is by induction on u. The base u = 1 is Lemma 4. Assume the claim is true for u; we have to prove it for u + 1 unknown agents. Suppose the known agents are A 1 , . . . , A n−u−1 and the unknown agents are A n−u , . . . , A n . Suppose that every known agent prefers at least 1 + 2 u pieces. We have to prove that an envy-free allocation can be attained with a bounded number of queries.
Ask agent A n−u to Equalize(1 + 2 u−1 ). This requires it to trim at most 2 u−1 pieces and guarantees that it prefers 1 + 2 u−1 pieces. Every known agent still prefers at least (1 + 2 u ) − 2 u−1 = 1 + 2 u−1 pieces. Hence, by adding A n−u to the set of known agents, the situation becomes exactly as in the induction assumption: there are u unknown agents each of whom prefers 1 + 2 u−1 pieces. Hence, by the induction assumption an envy-free allocation can be attained with a bounded number of queries.
The above proof immediately translates to a division protocol:
Ask A n−u to Equalize(2 u−1 + 1).
Initially, all agents are unknown. A 1 is asked to Equalize(2 n−2 + 1) and becomes a known agent. Each step, another agent is asked to Equalize and becomes a known agent. Finally, A n−1 is asked to Equalize(2); then, each of the first n−1 agents prefers at least 2 pieces, and by Lemma 4 a saturated matching exists. 7 Initially there is a single piece (the entire cake). Each Equalize action adds 2 u−1 new pieces. Hence the total number of pieces after the last cut is:
By the EFP Lemma, the division is envy-free, and each agent receives a single connected pieces with a value of at least: 1 2 n−1 which proves our Theorem 1. Remark 1. The protocol presented above is similar to a protocol mentioned by Brams and Taylor [7] (chapter 7, page 135) as a sub-routine of their unbounded protocol for envy-free cake-cutting with disconnected pieces. However, their sub-routine does not use the generalized Equalize query and hence does not guarantee any positive proportionality for the case of connected pieces.
Protocol for 3 Agents
Our goal in this and the next section is to improve the proportionality from the exponential figure guaranteed by the protocol of Section 4. In this section we focus on the case of 3 agents. We first note that any protocol starting with a pre-specified agent cutting 3 equal pieces cannot guarantee a proportionality of more than 1/4 with connected pieces (since the values of these pieces in the eyes of the other two agents might be 1/2, 1/4 and 1/4). However, when the cutting agent can be selected according to preferences, the optimal proportionality -1/3 -is attainable. This can be done by the following protocol: The "One of" statement means that the protocol should try each of the following execution paths on paper, and implement a path that leads to an envy-free and proportional division with proportionality 1/3. We now prove that for every preferences of the agents, at least one of these paths indeed leads to an envy-free and proportional division.
In this section, it is convenient to normalize the valuations such that each agent values the entire cake as 3. Hence, proportionality requires that each agent receives value at least 1.
Note that in each path, the agent that does the Equalize(3) always has at least one whole piece to choose from, so he always feels no envy and has value at least 1. It remains to prove that the same is true for the other two agents, in at least one path.
Assume, for the sake of the proof, that all agents are asked to Equalize(3). Each agent replies by marking two points in the interval [0, 1] that partition the cake to three subjectively-equal intervals. Denote the equal pieces of agent X by: 1 X , 2 X and 3 X , such that the value of i X to agent X is exactly 1.
Assume w.l.o.g. that the order of the first lines is A-B-C. Hence: 1 A ⊆ 1 B ⊆ 1 C . 8 There are 3! = 6 options for the order of the second lines. We treat each of these cases in turn.
C-B-A
Let Carl do the Equalize(3). Both Alice and Bob value two pieces -1 C and 3 C -as more than 1. Let one of them do the Equalize(2). At most one piece is trimmed, so for each agent, at least one remaining piece has value at least 1. Moreover, both the cutter and Carl have two preferred pieces, so by Lemma 4 an envy-free allocation exists.
C-
The analysis of the case C-B-A applies as is to this case.
A-B-C
Let Bob do the Equalize(3). If Alice and Carl prefer different pieces, then we are done -an envy-free allocation exists with the current 3 pieces, so by the EFP lemma the proportionality is 1/3. Otherwise, Alice and Carl prefer the same piece. This piece must be 2 B , since 1 B is worth less than 1 for Carl and 3 B is worth less than 1 for Alice. This means that 2 B is worth more than 1 for both Alice and Carl. Hence, each of them has two pieces worth at least 1: 1 B and 2 B for Alice, 2 B and 3 B for Carl. This is the same situation as in the case C-B-A. An Equalize(2) by either Alice or Carl guarantees an envy-free and proportional division. 8 Again we ignore the fortunate case in which two or more agents make a mark in the exact same spot. This case can be handled by assuming an arbitrary order between these agents. 
B-A-C
A-C-B
The previous case, A-B-C-B-A-C, is symmetric to A-B-C-A-C-B. This can be seen by renaming the agents from A-B-C to B-C-A and reversing the order of lines.
B-C-A
The last sub-case is handled according to Alice's preferences -whether she prefers 1 B (which contains 1 A ) or 3 C (which contains 3 A ). Note that Alice values both these pieces as at least 1.
If Alice prefers 1 B , then let Bob do the Equalize(3) and Alice do the Equalize (2) . Alice values two pieces as at least 1. As for Carl, there are two cases: If Alice trimmed 1 B , then 3 B remains untouched; its value for Carl is more than 1. If Alice trimmed 3 B , then she must have trimmed it at or to the left of the C mark, since she values 1 B more than 3 C . Hence, the value of the trimmed piece for Carl is still at least 1.
If Alice prefers 3 C , then let Carl do the Equalize(3) and Alice do the Equalize(2). Alice still values two pieces as at least 1. As for Bob, there are two cases: If Alice trimmed 3 C , then 1 C remains untouched; its value for Bob is more than 1. If Alice trimmed 1 C , then she must have trimmed it at or to the right of the B mark, since she values 3 C more than 1 B . Hence, the value of the trimmed piece for Bob is still at least 1.
This completes the correctness proof of the 3-agents division protocol and with it, the proof of Theorem 2. 9 
Protocol for 4 agents
Encouraged by the performance of the protocol of Section 5, we would like to extend it to produce a connected envy-free and proportional allocation for n agents. Unfortunately, the number of different cases becomes prohibitively large even for n = 4 agents. The equal partition of each agent is made by 3 parallel marks, so if we name the agents according to their 1st mark, the number of options for the following two marks is (4!) 2 = 576, and in general (n!) n−2 . The protocol for each specific case may be short, but writing down all the different cases takes too long to be practical.
Therefore we try to improve the protocol of Section 4 in another way. We note that the core of that protocol is Lemma 5, which is exponential in nature -it requires that every known agent prefers 1 + 2 u−1 pieces whenever there are u known agents. We would like to reduce this figure to 1+ u. Since for u ∈ {1, 2} these two expressions are equal, we focus on the case u = 3:
Lemma 6. Suppose the n agents are divided to n − 3 agents whose preferences are known and 3 agent whose preferences are unknown. If every known agent prefers at least 4 pieces, then an envy-free allocation exists.
Proof. We present a protocol for 4 agents, which we call an envy-free-VIP protocol. An envy-free-VIP protocol for n agents works in the following way:
• The agents are ordered in a pre-specified order.
• The first agent in that order (the "VIP agent") cuts the cake to n equal pieces.
• The following n − 2 agents make some cuts to these pieces, making sure to keep 2 pieces untouched. The cuts bring the preference graph to a situation in which each of the first n − 1 agents prefers two pieces.
• By Lemma 4, an envy-free allocation exists regardless of the preferences of the last agent.
An envy-free-VIP protocol for 4 agents proves Lemma 6, since we can pretend that every known agent is the VIP agent. Then, two of the three unknown agents can make some cuts, making sure to keep 2 pieces untouched, such that the all agents except the last unknown agent prefer two pieces. Sections 7 and 8 will show other applications to an envy-free-VIP protocol.
We now present our envy-free-VIP protocol for 4 agents. Let Alice be the VIP agent (who starts the protocol by cutting 4 equal pieces). Call the three unknown agents Bob, Carl and Dana. We claim that in the following division procedure, at least one execution path leads to a preference graph in which Alice, Bob and Carl each prefers two pieces: There are two cases regarding Carl's preferences: Easy case: After Bob's Equalize(2), the best piece of Carl is in { 1, 2} (left); or, after Bob's Equalize(3), the best piece of Carl is in { 3 BB , 4 BB } (right). In each case, after Carl does Equalize(2), Carl prefers two pieces while both Alice and Bob remain with two preferred pieces. By Lemma 4, an envy-free allocation exists. Here, the protocol implements one of the first two execution paths in the algorithm above (those in which Bob is the first equalizer):
Hard case: After Bob's Equalize(2), Carl's best piece is in { 3, 4 B }, and after Bob's Equalize(3), Carl's best piece is in { 1, 2}. These are 2 · 2 = 4 combinations for Carl's preferences, and they are all treated in a similar way. We analyze here only the combination in which Carl's best piece is 3 in the former case and 2 in the latter case:
Carl prefers piece 3 when it is not trimmed by Bob, but prefers piece 2 when 3 is trimmed by Bob, i.e. Carl's preference ordering is: 3 ≻ 2 ≻ 3 BB . We also know that for Carl, 3 ≻ 1 and 2 ≻ 1. Four preference orderings of Carl are compatible with these facts:
In case (I), the protocol implements the third path -the one that begins with Carl:Equalize(2). Carl trims piece 3 to make it equal to 2. Bob still prefers 4 (see left graph below).
In case (II), the protocol implements the fourth path -the one that begins with Carl:Equalize(3). Carl trims pieces 3 and 4 to make them equal to 2. Because for Carl: 2 ≻ C 3 BB , the fraction that Carl has to cut of 3 in order to make it equal to 2 is smaller than the fraction that Bob had to cut. Hence, the following global containment relation is true: 3 CC ⊇ 3 BB . Hence, for Bob: 3 CC ≻ B 2. Hence, after Carl's Equalize(3), Bob prefers either 3 CC or 4 CC (see right graph below):
In each case, Bob does Equalize(2). This ensures that Bob prefers two pieces while both Alice and Carl remain with two preferred pieces. By Lemma 4, an envy-free allocation exists.
Although the other combinations regarding Carl's preferences are similar to the one just described, we wanted to make sure that we didn't miss any important case. We wrote a program in SageMath [11] to generate a full proof for all cases. The primary data structure we used was the poset, which represents a partial order -a list of constraints such as 3 ≻ C 2. An empty poset has no constraints and can represent any preference relation. When constraints are added to the poset, the number of preference relations that match these constraints decreases. Eventually, after many constraints are added, the poset may become cyclic. This means that it cannot represent any rational preference relation.
For every agent, our program maintains one or more posets, each of which represents some possible partial preference relations of that agent. The posets are updated after each execution path is checked. For example, if the execution path "Bob:Equalize(2); Carl:Equalize(2)" fails, and Bob's preference relation is 4 ≻ 3 ≻ 2 ≻ 1, this implies that Carl's preferred piece is either 4 or 3; each of these options is translated to a list of constraints that is added to Carl's posets. If the second path "Bob:Equalize(3); Carl:Equalize(2)" fails too, new constraints are added to Carl's posets. After adding all the constraints from the four paths, all of Carl's posets become cyclic. This proves that it is impossible that all four execution paths fail. In other words, at least one execution path must succeed.
Our SageMath program generates a textual proof that can be read and verified independently of the program itself (i.e, it is not required to believe that the program is bug-free in order to verify the proof). The entire proof is given in Appendix A. 10 This completes the proof of Lemma 6. 
Protocols for disconnected pieces
In this section we use our results from the connected case to prove improved proportionality bounds in the disconnected case. We show that, if the pieces may be disconnected, we can have an envy-free division in which the value of each agent is arbitrarily close to 1/n. This is done using two general reduction lemmas which rely on envy-free-VIP protocols.
Denote by EnvyFree[n, M ] a cake-cutting procedure that produces an envy-free division of a part of the cake, in which all agents receive at least 1/M the total cake value.
Denote by EnvyFreeVIP[n, M ] a cake-cutting procedure that takes as input a VIP agent A i and returns an envy-free division of a part of the cake, in which A i receives a value of at least 1/M the total cake value.
Lemma 8. (Weak Reduction Lemma) For every n and M ≥ n, If there exists a procedure EnvyFreeVIP[n, M ] that uses T (n) queriesthen there exits a procedure EnvyFree[n, M ] that uses n · T (n) queries.
Proof. (generalizing an idea of Saberi and Wang [21] ). The idea is to use the existing procedure n times, each time on the remainder of the previous time and with a different agent as the VIP. This ensures that all agents enjoy the VIP proportion of 1/M . Let C be the original cake. Run EnvyFreeVIP[n, M ] on C with agent A 1 as the VIP. The result is a division of a certain subset of C (say, C ′ ⊆ C) with the following properties:
• The division of C ′ is envy-free.
• Hence, by the pigeonhole principle, every agent A i has a value of at least
• Moreover, A 1 holds a value of at least V 1 (C)/M .
If C ′ = C, then we are done since every agent A i holds a value of at least V i (C)/M . Otherwise, there is a remainder, C ′ = C \ C ′ , that should be divided. Run EnvyFreeVIP[n, M ] on that remainder with A 2 as the VIP. The result is a division of a certain subset C ′′ ⊆ C ′ with the following properties:
• The division of C ′′ is envy-free.
• Hence, by the pigeonhole principle, every agent A i holds a value of at least
• Moreover, A 2 has a value of at least V 2 (C ′ )/M .
Combining the two previous divisions, we now have a division of C ′ ∪ C ′′ , with the following properties:
• The division of C ′ ∪ C ′′ is envy-free (since it is a combination of two envy-free divisions).
• Hence, by the pigeonhole principle, every A i has a value of at least
• A 1 (still) has a value of at least V 1 (C)/M , since nothing was taken from him.
• A 2 has a value of at least
So after the second division, we have an envy-free division in which both A 1 and A 2 hold at least 1/M of their total cake value.
If C ′ ∪C ′′ = C then we are done. Otherwise, there is a remainder C ′ ∪ C ′′ that should be divided. Continue in the same way: run EnvyFreeVIP[n, M ] on that remainder with agent A 3 as the VIP, then with A 4 as the VIP, and so on. It is easy to prove by induction that, after at most n runs, all agents have at least 1/M of their total cake value.
The Weak Reduction Lemma is most useful in the case M = n. Note that EnvyFree[n, n] is an envy-free and proportional division procedure for n agents. The Weak Reduction Lemma implies that such a procedure can be attained using EnvyFreeVIP[n, n] -an envy-free division procedure which guarantees a value of at least 1/n to a single VIP agent.
The 4-agent procedure of Section 6 is, in fact, EnvyFreeVIP [4, 4] and uses a constant number of queries. This offers an alternative proof to a result by Saberi and Wang [21] :
Corollary 1. There exists an envy-free and proportional division protocol for 4 agents that uses a constant number of queries.
Currently we don't have an EnvyFreeVIP[n, n] procedure for n ≥ 5, so we don't know if EnvyFree[n, n] exists for n ≥ 5. However, the following lemma allows us to approach it to any desired precision. If there exists a procedure EnvyFreeVIP[n, M ] that uses T (n) queries, then there exits a procedure EnvyFreeVIP[n,
Proof. The main idea is to use the existing procedure many times, each time on the remainder of the previous time, with the same agent as the VIP. The value of the VIP agent grows like a geometric series and converges to 1/n. Hence, after a sufficient number of runs, the VIP agent's value is at least (1 − ǫ)/n.
The proof uses the following notation:
• t -the number of times EnvyFreeVIP[n, M ] has been run on successive remainders.
• C t (t ≥ 0) -the total cake that has been divided after time t. Initially C 0 = ∅.
• C ′ t (t ≥ 1) -the cake actually divided at time t (so C t = ∪ t j=1 C ′ j ).
• V t (t ≥ 0) -the total value held by the VIP agent after time t. Initially V 0 = 0.
• V ′ t (t ≥ 1) -the value given to the VIP agent at time t (so
Lemma 10. In every time t ≥ 1:
Proof. Since all divisions are envy-free, the cumulative division of C t−1 is also envy-free. This means that the VIP agent, like all other agents, holds at least a proportional share of it:
Note that the cake that has to be divided at time t is C \ C t−1 . At time t, the VIP agent receives at least a fraction 1/M of it:
Combining the previous two inequalities gives the desired inequality.
Lemma 11. In every time t ≥ 0:
Proof. By induction on t. For t = 0, by definition V 0 = 0. Suppose the claim is true for t, so there is a constant d ≥ 0 such that:
So:
Because M ≥ n, the rightmost term is positive and we get the desired inequality:
By Lemma 11, to get a value of at least V t ≥ (1 − ǫ)/n, it is sufficient to choose t such that:
(
It is sufficient to take:
By the log inequality: ln(1 − n/M ) < −n/M . Hence the required time is at most:
By combining the two reduction lemmas we get:
Corollary 2. For every n, M > n and ǫ > 0:
If there exists a procedure EnvyFreeVIP[n, M ] that uses T (n) queriesthen there exits a procedure EnvyFree[n,
In the procedure of Section 4, the first cutter cuts 2 n−2 + 1 equal pieces. Hence, this procedure is EnvyFreeVIP[n, 2 n−2 + 1]. The total number of queries is O(2 n ). Hence:
Corollary 3. For every n and ǫ > 0, there exits a procedure EnvyFree[n,
This completes the proof of our Theorem 3.
Application to envy-free division of an entire cake
Recently, Aziz and Mackenzie [4] have made an important breakthrough in the search for bounded-time envy-free cake-cutting protocols. They presented the first bounded-time protocol for envy-free cake-cutting of an entire cake to 4 agents. In this section, we present their results in a simpler and more general way, based on the idea of an envy-free-VIP protocol presented in Section 6.
The domination graph
The main new concept required for envy-free division of an entire cake is domination. 11 We say that Alice dominates Bob if Alice won't envy Bob even if the entire remaining cake is given to Bob.
To see how a domination relation is created, consider again the envyfree-VIP protocol for three agents, presented in Subsection 3.2. Alice does Equalize(3) and Bob does Equalize(2), cutting his favorite piece, say 3, to make it equal to his second-best, say 2. Mark the trimmed piece 3 B and the trimmings 4, so that 3 = 3 B ∪ 4. Suppose Carl's best piece is 2. So Carl takes 2, Bob takes 3 B , Alice takes 1, and 4 remains for the next round. Now, the following equalities hold for Alice:
Hence, even if the entire remainder ( 4) is given to Bob, Alice will not envy. This means that Alice dominates Bob.
The domination relation can be described by a domination graph. In a domination graph, the nodes are the agents and an edge between two agents means that the source node dominates the target node. In general, when an envy-free protocol is repeatedly executed, each time on the remainder of the previous time, edges are added to the domination graph but never removed.
Solvable domination graphs
We say that a domination graph is solvable if, once the state of the division arrives at that domination graph, the envy-free division problem can be reduced to simpler problems that we already know how to solve. The domination graphs in Figure 1 (b) and (c) are easily solvable: In the (b), Bob and Carl can divide the remainder between them using cut-andchoose; in (c), the entire remainder can be given to Bob. In general:
Lemma 12. If we know how to find an envy-free division for any number of agents smaller than n, and if the n agents can be divided to two nonempty groups such that every agent in group #2 dominates all agents in group #1, then the domination graph is solvable.
Proof. In group #1 there are less than n agents; let them divide the remainder among them in an envy-free way. Proof. The remaining cake can be divided in the following way: A 1 (the agent not in the sequence) cuts the cake to n equal parts. Then, the agents take pieces in the order A n , . . . , A 2 , A 1 . The agents in the sequence are not envious, because every agent dominates the agents that took pieces before him, and prefers his piece to the pieces taken by agents after him. A 1 is also not envious because all pieces are equal in his eyes. Figure 3 shows graphs for 3, 4 and 5 agents, that are solvable by Lemma 13. In (a), the sequence is {B,C}, and the solution of Lemma 13 yields the well-known Selfridge-Conway protocol. In (b) the sequence is {B,C,D} and in (c) it is {B,C,D,E}.
Combining the two previous lemmas gives a stronger lemma: Lemma 14 implies that the problem of envy-free division of an entire cake among n agents can be reduced to the following problem:
Find an envy-free allocation of a part of a cake, such that a pre-specified VIP agent dominates n − 2 agents.
We now show that this reduced problem can be solved for n = 4 agents.
The Equalize * query
First, we want to guarantee that after every run of an envy-free-VIP algorithm, the VIP agent (the cutter) will dominate one of the agents. In order to guarantee this, we must change the semantics of the Equalize query. We call the changed query Equalize * . An Equalize * (k) query asks an agent to cut his best k − 1 pieces, such that the trimmed pieces will be equivalent to the agent's k-th best piece. For example, an Equalize * (2) query to Bob in the above example implies the following question: "where would you cut piece 3, your currently favorite piece, such that the trimmed piece will be equivalent to 2?". Note that in this case (in contrast to the Equalize query), the trimmings may be more valuable than the trimmed piece. When Equalize * queries are used, the agents are not allowed to choose the trimmings; the trimmings are kept for later iterations. The agents are only allowed to take the trimmed pieces (hence, in contrast to the protocols using Equalize, there is no guarantee on the proportionality of the allocation after a single run of the algorithm). Since the number of original pieces is n, all trimmed pieces must be taken.
Based on the above observation, we now generalize a lemma proved by Aziz and Mackenzie [4] from 4 to n agents. Lemma 15 . Let C be a cake and X an envy-free division of a subset C ′ ⊂ C among n agents. Denote the remaining cake by C ′ = C \ C ′ . Suppose that for two agents (e.g. Alice and Bob) the following holds:
Creating a single domination-edge from the VIP
where k < n. Then, after running an envy-free-VIP algorithm a bounded number f (n) times with Alice as the VIP, Alice will dominate Bob.
Proof. Each run of an envy-free-VIP algorithm gives the VIP (Alice) a value of at least 1/n. Hence, the value of the remaining cake decreases by a factor of at least (n − 1)/n. Let f (n) = log n log(n)−log(n−1) . Note that f (n) > log k log(n/(n−1)) . Hence, after f (n) iterations, the value of the remaining cake for Alice is at most V A (C ′ )/k. When this happens, the difference between Alice's value to Bob's value (in Alice's eyes) is more than the value of the remainder; hence Alice dominates Bob.
Motivated by this lemma, we say that Alice k-dominates Bob, if
Bob (where k < n), then after a number of steps which is a bounded function of n, Alice will dominate Bob. Hence, from now on, we add an edge in the domination graph whenever the source node k-dominates the target node for some k < n.
Lemma 16. After a run of an envy-free-VIP protocol for n agents, the VIP k-dominates at least one other agent, where k < n.
Proof. An envy-free-VIP protocol starts by the VIP agent (say, Alice) cutting the cake to n equal pieces. Then, a certain number k < n of pieces are trimmed. Consider the following two cases.
(a) k = 0: all n pieces are taken with no trimmings. Then, the division is fully envy-free and no cake is left, so domination is trivial.
(b) 1 ≤ k < n: the divided cake is C ′ ⊆ C, and the remainder is C ′ = C \ C ′ . This remainder is the union of the k trimmings. Mark by i X the trimming taken from piece i. Then:
By the additivity of Alice's value measure:
Assume, without loss of generality, that the trimming of piece 1 has the largest value for Alice (Aziz and Mackenzie call such piece the significant piece). Then, by the pigeonhole principle, its value for Alice is at least 1/k the value of the remaining cake, so:
This means that Alice k-dominates the agent that took piece 1.
Lemma 16 guarantees that, after each run of an envy-free-VIP protocol, the domination graph contains an edge going from the VIP agent to another agent. Hence, n domination edges can be created by running the protocol n times with different VIP agents. But this may be insufficient to attain a solvable domination graph. The worst case is that, whenever a certain agent is the VIP, the same other agent takes the significant piece and hence the same domination edge is added again and again. Fortunately, Aziz and Mackenzie [4] found a way to shift domination edges to other agents.
Creating two domination-edge from the VIP
Suppose there are n agents and Alice is the VIP. Suppose that after the first run, Alice dominates Bob. Our goal now is to make Alice dominate another agent. We run the protocol again, this time keeping Bob as the last agent (the agent that does not trim). The other n − 2 agents trim some of the pieces, until each of the first n − 1 agents prefers at least two pieces (see Section 3.2 for a description on how it is done when n = 3 and Section 6 for the case n = 4). Now, Bob has to choose a piece. Suppose w.l.o.g. that Bob's best piece is 1 and his second-best piece is 2. There are two cases:
Easy case: 1 is not the significant piece. Then, another agent takes the significant piece and is k-dominated by Alice. Now two different domination edges emanate from Alice, as we wanted.
Hard case: 1 is the significant piece. Consider now what happens if Bob takes 2 instead of 1. The other agents will not care, since each of the other agents prefers at least two pieces. But then Bob might envy the agent (say, Carl) who takes 1. In this case, we say that Bob competes with Carl on the significant piece. Let ∆V = V B ( 1) − V B ( 2). If Bob takes 1 then Bob has an advantage of at least ∆V over Carl; if Bob takes 2 then Bob has an envy of ∆V at Carl (Carl does not envy Bob in either case since Carl prefers two pieces). Now, suppose the protocol is run again and again with the same VIP, and each time we fall into the same hard case in which the same Bob prefers the significant piece. Eventually (after at most n runs), Bob competes with an agent with whom he already competed in the past (e.g, Bob competes Carl again). Now, we ask Bob in which of these two runs the ∆V is larger. If the ∆V was larger in the first run, then in the second run we give Bob his second-best piece; if the ∆V was larger in the second run, then in the first run we change the allocation and give Bob his second-best piece. In either case, Bob will not be envious since the larger ∆V cancels the envy caused by the smaller ∆V .
The above discussion can be summarized in the following lemma:
Lemma 17. After at most n runs of an envy-free-VIP protocol for n agents, the VIP k-dominates at least two other agents.
Plugging Lemma 17 into Lemma 14 yields Aziz & Mackenzie's envy-free cake-cutting protocol for 4 agents.
Future Work
The two main questions left open by the present paper are:
• In the case of connected pieces: is there a bounded-time envy-free and proportional protocol for 4 or more agents?
• In the case of disconnected pieces: is there an envy-free-VIP protocol for 5 or more agents in which the VIP agent dominates n − 2 agents? Such a protocol can be used as a building block both for constructing envy-free and proportional protocols with free disposal (as in Section 7) and for constructing envy-free protocols of an entire cake (as in Section 8).
The protocol of Section 6, which uses a small number of actions with a finite number of possible outcomes for each action, suggests that it may be possible to utilize AI planning tools for constructing division protocols when the number of agents is sufficiently small. 
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